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LOOKING BACK ON A CENTURY OF
COMPLETE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW
ROBERT VOGEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Codification of substantive law has always been rare in the Eng-
lish-speaking world, although common in civil-law countries,1 dating
back to the days of imperial Rome.
2
Georgia and Dakota Territory were the first jurisdictions in the
English-speaking world to codify their entire body of law, both leg-
islative and judicial.3
When Georgia and Dakota Territory were codifying their sub-
stantive as well as procedural law, they were making jurisprudential
history. However, probably neither realized what the other was doing,
and imperfectly realized how historically important their own acts
were. It is doubtful that any information on codification passed be-
tween Georgia and Dakota Territory in the early 1860s, when they
were most active in codifying, because the Civil War was being fought
and Georgia was a Confederate state, while Dakota Territory was on
the northern frontier.
The lack of realization of the historic importance of Dakota Ter-
ritory's codification is indicated by the context in which it is men-
tioned in the standard history of the Territory, written contempor-
aneously. Kingsbury's History of Dakota Territory4 lists the adop-
, Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court; B.S., 1939, University of North Dakota;
LL.B:, 1942, Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law (now consolidated into William
Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota).
1. The Napoleonic Code of 1803 is the foundation of much of the law of Europe, as
well as Quebec and, to some extent, Louisiana, on this continent. If we keep in mind the
distinction between codification as an attempt to state anew all the law in written form,
on the one hand, and a collection, digest, or compilation of preexisting statutes, with or
without annotations, on the other, Georgia and Dakota Territory were the first in codifica-
tion. Mere compilation nf the laws was nothing new. Pennsylvania made a "Code," ac-
tually a compilation, of its property law 100 years before the codes of David Dudley Field.
Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 396 (1907). Louisiana codified some of its law, based to
a great extent on France's Napoleonic Code and upon Spanish law, in 1808. The leader
In its codification was Edward Livingston, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, as was Field.
For Livingston's debt to Bentham, see Dillon, Bentham's Influence in the Reforms of the
Nineteenth Century, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 507-08n.1
(1907).
2. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (2d American ed. 1874) (2d London ed. n.d.), said of
Roman law, "The most celebrated system of jurisprudence known to the world begins as
it ends with a Code." Id. at 1.
3. The documentation for this statement, and a demonstration that Georgia was first,
require another article by this author, as yet unpublished.
4. 1 G. KINGSBURY, HISTORY OF DAKOTA TERRITORY (1915).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW'
tion of substantive civil and penal codes as only one of the multiple
accomplishments of the 1865 Territorial Legislature, which included
the passage of private divorce bills, authorization of wolf bounties,
fence and herd laws, and an act authorizing a county to build a jail. 5
Nevertheless, the adoption of substantive codes was an epic a-
chievement and the culmination of great efforts of legal reformers
for more than a century and a half. If the actual codifiers of early
Dakota Territory legislatures did not realize the historic importance
of their actions, later observers, in the Dakotas and elsewhere, did
so.,
I. NINETEENTH CENTURY ARGUMENTS ON CODIFICATION
Peter C. Shannon, then Chief Justice of the Territorial Supreme
Court, was one of the three commissioners who drafted the Terri-
torial Revised Code of 1877. He was recognized by Clement A. Louns-
berry, North Dakota historian, as chiefly responsible for the codifi-
cation of 1877 and the modifications included in it. 7 Shannon lauded
David Dudley Field, the principal author of the New York codes, as
equal in stature to the author of the Roman Justinian Code, and said
that the Field Codes owed much to the Roman law as expressed in
the Code of Justinian.
8
Professor William B. Fisch, in two articles,9 outlines the drive
for codification in England and in America and the mixed results
achieved. Both his articles and the preface to the 1943 Revised Code10
reveal the Dakotas' debt to Jeremy Bentham, the father of modern
codification, and his followers.
From about 1830 on, legal literature in the United States was full
of articles for and against the idea of "codification,"' 1 a word which,
incidentally, was coined by Jeremy Bentham. Field's chief opponent,
5. Id. at 429-30.
6. See 1 C. LOUNSBERRY, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA (1917).
7. Id. at 437.
8. Id. at 438. On the death of David Dudley Field, Chief Justice Shannon of Dakota
Territory wrote:
'His [David Dudley Field's] Ideal and model was the code of Justinian,
which for thirteen centuries has been considered as one of the noblest bene-
factions to the human race, as it was one of the greatest achievements of
human genius. His studies early taught him that the Justinian code is, indeed,
the chief source whence have been drawn most of the best principles and doc-
trines of boasted common law.
Id.
9. Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 43 N.D.L. REV. 485 (1966)
The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45 N.D.L. REv. 9
(1968).
10. N.D. REV. CODE, preface at 5 (1943).
11. See, e.g., THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA-FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR (P.
Miller ed. 1969), which contains a selection of speeches for and against codification. Ar-
ticles in favor of codification and against common-law methods are those by William
Sampson, Henry Dwight Sedgwick, and Thomas Smith Grimke.
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James Coolidge Carter, wrote an entire book in opposition to the
idea of codification. 2
One of the more interesting articles in favor of codification points
out that the common law is actually only the "custom of the people
of the southern part of a little island in the North Atlantic.. ,,I'
and that "[o]ur real property law is the product, not of the necessi-
ties of the American people, but of the armed knights of the feu-
dal ages. . . . ,,1 In language which anticipates the difficulty of pre-
serving codes against enervating judicial interpretation, George
Hoadly points out that our lawyers are trained in the case-law sys-
tem and in English legal history, and that "[l]awyers live too often
intellectually in England, and not in the world." 1 Therefore, after
spending two or three years mentally in England, a lawyer spends
his life insular, looking backward instead of forward, following rules
the reasons for which have been lost, and following a tunc pro nunc
policy.
Bentham and his followers, on the other hand, were regarded
by many, and perhaps most, lawyers and jurists, as freaks, cranks,
and fools. Carter variously describes Bentham's ideas as gibberish
and absurdity."3 Professor Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., called Bentham's
idea that law made by legislatures is better than law made by judges
"a curious ignorance one is perhaps not quite justified in calling in-
sane. " Bentham paid his respects to the common law by calling
it
that fictitious composition Which has no known person for
its author, no known assemblage of words for its substance,
forms every where the main body of the legal fabric: like
that fancied ether, which, in default of sensible matter, fills
up the measure of the universe. Shreds and scraps of real
law, stuck on upon that imaginary ground, compose the fur-
niture of every national code. What follows?-that he who,
.. .wants an example of a complete body of law to refer.
to, must begin with making one.' s
III. WHY DAKOTA TERRITORY?
With battle lines so clearly drawn, it is all the more remark-
able that Dakota Territory should have adopted its codes almost
by indifference. Kingsbury describes the event in this manner:
12. J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907). This book contains a
series of lectures that Nvvre to be given at the Harvard University School of Law In the
spring of 19115, but carter died in Iohruary of that year.
13. Hoadly, Codificatioil of thc Com oi Law, 23 Am. L. REV. 495, 496 (18S9) (first
given as an address at the American Bar Association meeting in 1888).
14. Id. at 497.
15. Id. at 496.
16. J. CARTER, supra note 12.
17. Beale, The Decl lopmrtOt of JuIrisprIudree Du rhin the YieteeIth Century, In 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANA;LO-.\IERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 55S (1907).
18. J. BENTHAM, THE 'RINCIPLES OF M.\IORALS AND LEGISLATION at xxx-xxxi (1948).
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The codes [civil and penal, from New York] were completed
in February, 1865 [in New York], but had not been passed
upon by the Legislature of the Empire State, when a
printed copy of the report of the commission containing the
civil and penal codes, and also the maritime code, came into
the possession of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Da-
kota, then composed of Ara Bartlett, chief justice; Jefferson
P. Kidder and William E. Gleason, associate justices; all good
lawyers, and all favorably impressed by the codes prepared
by Mr. Field. The codes adopted by the Dakota Legislature
in March at the first session, in 1862, had not proved satis-
factory in every respect, and the bench and bar of the ter-
ritory united upon recommending that they be repealed and
the Field Codes substituted in their stead. This was done at
this session, the Legislature of Dakota being the first legisla-
tive body to enact and put in operation these excellent laws. 1'9
Perhaps some explanation of the lack of notice of the historical
Importance of codification by the Territory of Dakota is found in the
fact that the population of the Territory in 1870 was 14,181, probably
exclusive of Indians.2 0 Of the 14,181, only 2,405 lived in the northern
part of the Territory, which later became North Dakota. 21 In 1862,
when the first of the codes was adopted, the population of Dakota
Territory was only 2,402.22
Another reason for the contemporary lack of interest in Dakotan's
codification may be that it occurred during the Civil War era and a
period of deep depression in the Territory of Dakota.
2 3
One of the motives for the adoption of the codes by the early
legislators of Dakota Territory was that they needed laws at once,
and the Field Codes were available in handy form.
2 4
Another motive may have been a distrust of judge-made law,
due in part to the fact that the territorial judges were political ap-
pointees from the eastern states, unfamiliar with local conditions.
Lamar calls them, along with all other territorial officials, "political
hacks. ' 25 One Chief Justice, French, had no prior judicial or legal
experience when appointed. At one point the three supreme court
judges were described by a politician of their own political party,
who himself later became a judge'and then a senator, as "an ass,
a knave, and a drunkard."2 6 The "ass" and the "knave" were re-
moved the next year, but not the "drunkard." Most of the territor-
ial judges were also active in politics. For example, Judges Kidder
19. 1 G. KINGSBURY, supra note 4, at 429-30.
20. U.S. DEPT. COTNINIrlCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, V. I, pt. A, sec. 1 at 1-49 (1972).
21. Id.
22. DAKOTA TERRITORY H. JoUR. 50-51 (1S62) (legislative census).
23. H. LAMAR, DAKOTA TERRITORY 1861-18S9 at 98 (1956).
24. For similar actions in the early American colonial period, see L. FRIEDMAN, A His-
TORY OF AMERICAN LAW 78-81 (1973).
25. H. LAMAR, supra note 23, at 118.
26. Id. at 138.
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and Bennett actively sought election as territorial delegate during
much of their terms.2 7 Kidder was elected delegate while a judge
and resigned only after the election "to prepare for his congressional
duties."
28
The general level of judicial competence may be indicated by
the fact that jurors challenged for bias in a criminal case were al-
lowed to sit even though they had expressed opinions in the case
and two were bondsmen for the defendant.
29
Another reason for preferring a code to the common law may
have been the common frontier attitude of independence and the feel-
ing that a frontiersman could do anything he set his mind to, in-
cluding the making and interpreting of laws. The latter attitude has
persisted. An interesting example is found in chapter 82 of the Laws
of 1891 of the State of North Dakota, providing for a commission
to revise the laws, with the commission to consist of two attorneys
at law and one "experienced businessman. 13 9 A continuation of this
attitude may be indicated by the fact that the percentage of law-
yers in the North Dakota Legislature usually is about 10 percent,
compared with the 20 percent to 50 percent or more membership of
lawyers in other legislatures.
A distrust of lawyers is part of the Benthamite tradition. Con-
sider one of Bentham's descriptions of lawyers:
With minds of every class the mind of the lawyer has to
deal. Of the structure of the human mind what does the law-
yer know? Exactly what the grub knows of the bud it preys
upon. By tradition, by a blind and rickety kind of exper-
ience, by something resembling instinct, he knows by what
sophisms the minds of jurymen are poisoned; by what jar-
gon their understandings are be bewildered; how, by a name
of reproach, the man who asks for the execution of the laws,
and the formation of good ones, is painted as an enemy,-
the judge who by quibbles paralyzes the laws which exist,
and strains every nerve to prevent their improvement, is
pointed out as an idol to be stuffed with adoration and with
offerings.31
IV. SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS ON THE CODIFICATION BY DA-
KOTA TERRITORY
Professor Fisch's articles give a good account of attacks on the
New York codes, which, inferentially, at least, also are attacks on
27. Id. at 163, 171-73.
28. 1 G. KINGSBURY, supra note 4, at 740-41.
29. Id. at 741.
30. Ch. 82 [1891] N.D. Seass. Laws 224.
31. J. BENTHAM, A BENTHAM READER 226 (M.P. Mack ed. 1969).
229
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the Dakota Codes. 2 English opinion in particular was rather haughty
in tone.3 3 English criticisms were taken up with delight by Field's
chief adversary, Carter, and quoted in his book.3 4 But, as, will be
seen, even England had codified a, part of its law before Dakota Ter-
ritory and Georgia acted, and codified more later.
The Dakota Codes were given occasional attention, usually un-
favorable, by leaders of the British and American bars. Sir Fred-
erick Pollock eminent legal historian and lifelong correspondent with
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was sympathetic to codification in
India, made these references to the western codes, meaning those
of California and the Dakotas:
That blessed Indian Specific Relief Act is still with me-
not quite so bad as the corresponding sections of the New York
Civil Code, on which it was partly modelled. It is strange
how little harm bad codes do. I have not heard that even the
New York abortion has done very much in the States where
it has been enacted. Quare however what would happen if it
were turned loose on a virgin jurisdiction where there were
no professional traditions. 5
And,
[i]t is true that, when the law is pretty well settled, adven-
turous definitions do less harm than might be expected (In-
dian Contract Act-and the N.Y. draft Civil Code in your
Western jurisdictions which foolishly adopted it).36
Holmes said of the publication of the Code of Procedure of the
State of New York, as amended to 1870: "To say that the latest edi-
tion of the Code is a necessity to every New York lawyer is to say
very little, and yet it is difficult to say more.
'3 7
Holmes expressed the view that codes can never anticipate future
factual situations for all cases, so a code at best can constitute only
"a mere textbook recommended by the government as containing all
at present known on the subject." 3 He said that codes cannot be
short, and cannot make each man his own lawyer, as the makers
of the New York codes seemed to hope they would.39 Holmes fur-
ther stated that a code would not get rid of the lawyers and should
32. Fisch, supra note 9.
$3. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45
N.D.L. REv. 9, 11-12 (1968).
34. J. CARTER, supra note 12, at 313-15.
35. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LErrSES 1874-1932 at 268 (2d ed. M.D. Howe ed. 1961) (com-
bining two volumes into one) [hereinafter cited as LETTERS].
36. 2 LETTERS, supra note 35, at 199.
37. Holmes, Value of the New York Codo, 5 AM. L. REV. 359 (1871), reprinted in
HOLMES, BOOK NOTICES, UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 57 (H.C. Shriver ed. 1936).
38. Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870), Part I
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be written for them much more than the laity, and that the chief
advantage of codification is making a philosophically arranged cor-
pus juris possible, at the expense of the government and not at the
risk of the writer.40
V; WAS BENTHAM RIGHT? WAS CODIFICATION A SUCCESS?
We cannot assume that even England has resisted all codifica-
tion. It has codified large parts of its land law, its commercial law,
its administrative law, and its criminal law.41 Its first codification,
the Merchant Shipping Act, in 185442 preceded the adoption of the
Dakota Codes. England also has codified its procedure, although the
codification was done largely by the judiciary rather than by Parlia-
ment.43 Even its codification by the judiciary of its- procedure owes
much to Bentham.
Certainly it is the modern view that legislation is the primary
function of the legislature, rather than the courts. To this extent Ben-
tham was clearly right. But, Bentham tended to overlook or mini-
mize the fact that a function of the courts is to fill in the lacunae,
to legislate "interstitially," as Justice Holmes put it.4
No legislature can anticipate every conceivable variety of factual
and legal problem and legislate in advance to solve the problem.
Concrete cases come before courts daily where decisions must be
made, even though there is no legislative rule. If Bentham thought
he could legislate for all conceivable conditions, he was wrong.
Bentham was likewise out of step with American doctrine in his
opposition to written constitutions, particularly those containing gen-
eral statements of abstract rights.45 He believed in the superiority
of legislatures and in their unlimited powers. This view, however,
was simply not adaptable to America, where the legislature is only
one of three coequal branches of government. Because of his view
of the superiority of legislative law, he never had to face the prob-
lems of conflicts between legislative law and constitutional law. It
is these conflicts which have resulted in the power of American courts
to declare laws unconstitutional.
40. Id. at 64-65.
41. F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 362-67 (5th ed. 1923); 0. KAHN-
FREUND, INTRODUCTION TO KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR
SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949), partially reprinted int H. BERMAN, THE 'NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
OF LAW 277, 278 (1958).
42. F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRI/DENCE 362 (5th ed. 1923).
43. English procedure is codified by rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature pursuant
to parliamentary authorization, Judicature Act, 35 & 36 Vic. cap. 66 (1873). See 5 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 436-37 (1959).
44. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. Bentham ridiculed the Declaration of Independence and the declarations of rights
in state constitutions by asserting tiat every coercive law violates provisions which gives
persons the right to enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. J. BENTHAM, supra note 18.
at 835-36.
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Of course, Bentham did not believe that laws could be promul-
gated for all time. But, he thought they could be stated simply and
clearly as they existed at any one given time and that the legislatures
could and would make necessary changes. In believing that legisla-
tures could make such changes, he was undoubtedly correct; but in
believing that all necessary changes would be made, he was very
wrong. Legislatures can and do make the great policy changes, but
courts must, of necessity, make the small adjustments, and some
not so small. There are small changes which the legislature in its
ponderous movements cannot be prevailed upon to make. There are
larger changes which ought to be made but are not made, because
no political force exists at the time which is sufficient to put the
weight of the legislature into motion. The "silver platter" doctrine 4
was an abomination, a way of letting lawbreakers on police forces
of one jurisdiction supply evidence to other police forces, but few
legislatures seemed to care. Some courts did care and declared




No legislature, as another example, is likely to legislate in such
detail that the law will provide guidance on how far policemen may
go in getting confessions, but courts can and necessarily do so.
4
3
In "pricking out" the limits of permissible conduct courts are far
better than legislatures, and they can correct errors better and fast-
er than legislatures can. It is also true, as critics of codes have
always maintained, that no code can be complete, even as to pre-
existing law. Within a recent period of a month or two, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has grappled with several cases which one
would think would have been settled by the provisions of the code,
but were not.
The North Dakota Supreme Court through the years has had sev-
eral cases involving claims of incompatibility of positions, and has
always held that the common law applied, since the code was silent.
For example, in Tarpo v. Bowman Public School District No. 1,49
the question was whether the positions of a school teacher and a mem-
46. The "silver platter" doctrine was first expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). Although that case held that the evidence obtained
should have been suppressed, the distinction was made whether state or federal officials
did the searching. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official
If he had a hand In it: it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a
silver platter.
Id. at 78-79.
47. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
State decisions were divided on the question and North Dakota, unfortunately, followed
the now-disallowed "silver platter" doctrine. 'See State v. Lacy, 55 N.D. 83, 212 N.,V. 442
(1927) ; State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 NWV. 67 £1925).
48. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mallory v. United States, 854 U.S.
449 (1947) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
49. 232 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1975).
COMPLETE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW
ber of the board of education in the same district were incompatible.
The court held that the two positions were contrary to each other,
and that the teacher should have a choice of which position to va-
cate.50
In City of Bismarck v. Muhlhauser,51 one of the questions argued,
but not decided, was whether a defaulting defendant had to show
diligence before he could be permitted to reopen the judgment against
him. The statute5 2 does not mention diligence, but case law, al-
though subject to two interpretations, sometimes did.
53
A third case, Tong v. Borstad5 4 involved the interesting ques-
tion of whether, and to what extent, custom is law where the code
is silent. The case involved a tenant farmer under a land share-
crop rental agreement where more summer fallow was left on the
premises at the termination of the tenancy than had existed at the
beginning. The court held that under such circumstances the tenant
would be allowed to show local custom and usage enabling him to
be compensated for the difference in value.
55
Bentham was wrong, too, in underestimating the part that cus-
toms have in making the law, and the extent of which changing
customs change the law. One has only to read court decisions of
even thirty or forty years ago to realize how much the law has
changed in ways untouched by legislation or even specific court de-
cision. The decisions have changed largely because public opinion
and customs have changed. Justice Cardozo cites the example of the
change in attitude toward spouses who refuse to live with each oth-
er. 56 Not long ago, a wife could be forced to remain with her hus-
bandunless he consented to her departure. In 1927, when Cardozo
wrote, and even less today, one would not think of using force to
keep a wife at home. Yet the statutes did not change. The change
was made by public opinion and custom, and now courts recognize
the change.
Another factor which Bentham and Field must have underesti-
mated in believing that codes would triumph over the common law
is the effect of the common-law training, and the institutional iner-
tia, of judges and lawyers. When the codes were adopted, Dakota's
lawyers had all been educated in the East, at common-law schools,
or in offices by common-law-trained practitioners. 57 The result was
50. Id. at 71.
51. 234 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1975).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-17-13 (1976).
53. Hagen v. Altman, 79 N.W.2d 53, 60 (N.D, 1956) ; Huwe v. Singer, 63 N.W.2d 399,
400 (N.D. 1954) ; Azar v. Olson, 61 N.W.2d 188, 190 (N.D. 1953).
54. 231 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1975).
55. Id. at 800.
56. B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 18 (1928).
57. All the early judges were from eastern states, and all the delegates to the North
Dakota Constitutional Convention of 1889 were born outside the Dakota Territory. See
N.D. CONST. CONVENTION OF 1889, PFOCFXDINOS AND DEBATES 4 (1889).
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that early lawyers and judges applied common-law modes of think-
ing in arguing and deciding cases and cited common-law precedents,
even though the code clearly stated that the common law did not
apply in the Territory of Dakota unless there was no statute to cov-
er the situation."8
Sometimes the courts emasculated a statute by following case
law from other, usually common-law states, even where it conflicted
with the code. 9
Professor 3. 0. Muus told with some regret how little the Codes
of North Dakota were used in teaching at law schools in code states,
even at the University of North Dakota Law School. 0
Professor Fisch mentioned how the Civil Code section on negli-
gence, even though it seemed clearly to adopt the rule of compar-
ative negligence -by providing that a tortfeasor is liable to another
"except so far as the latter has, willfully, or by want of ordinary
care, brought the injury upon himself,"' 6 1 was regularly interpreted
to provide only for contributory negligence as an absolute defense.
6 2
After Professor Fisch's article appeared, North Dakota District Judge
Eugene A. Burdick interpreted the same statute in accordance with
its apparent meaning, but the North Dakota Supreme Court, after
reviewing many decades of contrary interpretation, reversed Judge
Burdick.6 3 Legislative action subsequently adopted comparative neg-
ligence as the law of North Dakota.6 4 A literal interpretation of the
code by early judges would have done so almost 100 years sooner. 5
California, with the same statute,6 6 recently refused to construe its
58. DAK. CIV. CODE § 6 (1865-66), presently found in N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1975).
59. For example, N.D. COMP. LAWS § 5918 (1913) provided: "Time is never considered as
of the essence of a contract unless by Its terms expressly so provided."
In Sunshine Cloak & Suit Co. v. Roquette Bros., 30 N.D. 143, 152 N.W. 359 (1915).
the court nevertheless held that the time for delivery of clothing for the fall season was
held to be of the essence, although the contract was silent on the subject. Id. at 148-49.
156-57, 152 N.W. at 361, 364.
Even more inexplicably, In Asplund v. Danielson, 56 N.D. 485, 217 N'.W. 848 (1918).
a written contract which provided in its entirety that "I agree to take this stock from
V. Asplund at $100 on the 1st day of May, 1920," id. at 487, 217 N.W. at 849, was held, in
spite of the same statute, to provide that time was of the essence, and a demand to take
the stock and pay the money on June 1, 1920, was held to be too late. Id. at 490, 217 N.W.
at 850. For an example of hostility of the United States Supreme Court to codification,
see McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 523 (1857).
60. Muus, The Influence of the Civil Code on the Teaching of Law at the University of
North Dakota, 4 N.D.L. REV. 175 (1932).
61. DAK. CIV. CODE § 853 (1865-66). amended by Ch. 78, § 3 [1973] N.D. Sess. Laws
143, 143-44 (codified in N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1975)).
62. Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 43 N.D.L. REV. 485, 514-15
(1966).
63. Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971).
64. Ch. 78, § 1 [1973] N.D. Sess. Laws 143, 143 (codified in N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1975)).
65. See Bostwick v. Minneapolis & P. Ry. Co., 2 N.D. 440, 51 N.W. 781 (1892). where
the court said that the code section in question, DAK. CIv. CODE § 853 (1865-66), merely
"declares and confirms that rule as recognized and explained in the foregoing cases," all
of which were from non-Field Code states. Id. at 454-55, 51 N.W. at 786.
66. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (1973).
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statute literally, but adopted "pure" comparative negligence by jud-
icial action.
6 7
In summary, Bentham and his followers were not as successful
as they hoped to be because: (1) they wrongly assumed that legis-
latures could and would keep up with all changes, great and small,
in customs and practices and make needed modifications in the
law; 68 (2) they underestimated the degree and speed of changes in
customs and public opinion; (3) they underestimated the inertia and
conservatism of judges and lawyers who had been trained in common-
law methods of reasoning and the use of common-law precedents;
(4) they understated the importance of interstitial interpretation by
the courts; and (5) their system was not fully adaptable to a gov-
ernment where constitutional mandates prevailed over legislative law.
However, it must be recognized that Bentham and his followers,
especially Field, accomplished much, and substantial credit is due
them.
First of all, we must recognize that they gave to the sparsely
settled wilderness of Dakota an instant body of law, up-to-date and
reasonably adaptable to immediate use. There simply was not time
to develop a body of law by common-law methods, and the choice
appeared to be between codification or anarchy and vigilante justice.
Second, the codifiers were greatly successful in simplifying pro-
cedure. No lawyer in Dakota Territory, or the states of North Dakota
and South Dakota, has had to delve deeply into the distinction be-
tween legal and equitable jurisdiction 9 or the esoteric differences
between forms of pleading or forms of writs. There is only one form
of action and one body of law.
Third, most states now have a vast body of codified law, al-
though the laws are not always legislative in origin. These states
are indebted to Bentham and Field and their followers for providing
an incentive to codify. Procedure is largely codified everywhere.
True, codification today is usually made by courts, not by legisla-
tures, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure,
and Appellate Procedure, and the corresponding state rules, as well
as the new Federal Rules of Evidence, 70 all owe much to the New
York (Field) Codes of Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure. Da-
kota Territory was among the earliest jurisdictions to adopt the Field
Codes, and the lawyers of the Dakotas never have had to learn by
67. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
6S. Professor John Henry ,Vigmore astutely stated: "A code fixes error as well as
truth." W'igmore, A Gencral Saurvey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in II SELECT
ESSAYs ix ANGLO-AMERICAN LEVAL HISTORY, 691, 701 (1907).
69. The distinction between legal and equitable jurisdiction is no longer important
except to determine whether a jury trial is available. N.D.R. Civ. P. 38(a). See Gresens
v, Martin, 27 N.D. 231, 145 N.W. 823 (1914).
70. North Dakota Rules of Evidence, based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, were
adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court on December 1, 1976, and will become ef-
fective on February 15, 1977, or as soon thereafter as publication of the rules is complete.
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hard knocks the great importance of the reforms made by Field.
Similarly, the courts have worked a quiet revolution of codifica-
tion in another way, by modifying the law of the several states to
conform to such recommended codes as the Restatements of the Law
by the American Law Institute and the Uniform Laws recommended
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. All of these are codes
and all of them owe much to Bentham and Field and their followers.
North Dakota has been a leader in these kinds of codification
also. It is second among all the states in the number of Uniform
Laws adopted, approximately eighty-five; 71 it has frequently cited and
adopted rules from the Restatements; and it was the first jurisdic-
tion in the nation to adopt an Administrative Agencies Practice
Act, 72 also a form of codification.
Critics of codification occasionally have asserted that codifica-
tion has failed because it did not reduce the volume of litigation.
But, their documentation of the claim is imprecise and unconvincing,
consisting only of a comparison of the number of volumes of reports
of the courts in various jurisdictions.7 3 These comparisons are sus-
pect for many reasons. For example, there is no way to compare
.the proclivity for litigation of various jurisdictions. Pioneer settle-
ments probably had more litigation per capita than more stable pop-
ulation groups. Certainly the per capita number of lawsuits in pio-
neer North Dakota was higher than it presently is. A comparison
of the number of books of reported decisions in each jurisdiction
gives no indication of the average length of opinions. Justice Robin-
son of North Dakota once claimed that North Dakota decisions were
the longest in the nation.7 4 If so, it would take fewer decisions to
make a volume.
Professor Fisch suggested that the codes had lost their identity,
and presumably had partially failed, because the original format
was destroyed in subsequent codifications. 75 In 1943 particularly, the
original format of separate political, procedural, and substantive
codes was abandoned in North Dakota, and an alphabetical format
of sixty chapters was substituted. But surely this is a relatively un-
important change if the content of the original codes was retained,
71. Conversation with the Honorable Eugene -A.-B urdick, form~er Chairman of Com-
missioners of Uniform State Laws, Sept. 18, 1975. On December 1, 1976, the North Da-
kota Supreme Court adopted the Uniform Class Actions Rule, by amending N.D.R. Civ. P.
23, and the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Rule, which became N.D.R. APP. P.
47.
72. Chap. 240 [1941] N.D. Sess. Laws 393 (codified in N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (1974),
as anended, (Supp. 1975)), ixas adopted two years before Wisconsin's and five years
p5rior to approval of the Model Act by the National Conference of Commissoners on Uni-
form State [.ans and the American Ptar Association. Cooper, Turning the Spotlight on
State Admi ,ish . tiC I'FocedurC, 4q A.B.A.J. 29, 30n.4 (1963).
73. See, e.g., .1. CARTER, stiprnf note 12, at 308.
74. J. ROBINSON, \RONGS AND REMEDIES 73 (1923).
75. Fisch, supra note 33, at 54.
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as it was to a large extent. I suspect that well over three-fourths
of the original code sections are retained in our present Code, either
unchanged or with only minor changes. If so, a change of format
without a change of substance is surely no indication of a failure
of the original concept.
Finally, in comparing the relative virtues of codes and the com-
mon law, there is no way to determine how many lawsuits were
avoided simply because the plain and simple definitions of the codes
left no room for argument, and lawsuits were accordingly not com-
menced or were settled rather than litigated. Field gives as one of
his examples of imprecision in the common law the number of cases
involving the definition of "navigable, '17 and says that all of these
lengthy and expensive lawsuits could have been avoided by a code
definition specifying a meaning for the word. Similarly, other law-
suits may have been avoided by the codes, and we have no way of
knowing how many there were.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the author's opinion that the overall effect of the codes has
been beneficial. Certainly, the benefits to the pioneers in a hostile
and lawless land must have been immense. But even in later years,
the benefits of the complete statement of the law as of the 1860s can
still be seen. North Dakotans learned early the habit of legislating
comprehensively and interpreting through the courts in detail. A
written law, after all, is more likely to create a government of laws,
not of men, and this has been the aim of justice through the cen-
turies.
The habit of codifying laws has stayed with the state, and North
Dakotans therefore have been among the leaders in reforming ad-
ministrative and judicial procedure. North Dakota has rules of civil,
criminal, and appellate procedure; more than eighty Uniform Laws;
and a complete body of statutory law.
Many changes have been made since the first Dakota Code was
adopted, and the changes have been made by many methods"- leg-
islation, judicial interpretation, and the use of the initiative. But, an
impressive amount of the original codes remains in effect, adequate-
ly performing its functions.
I suggest that we should salute Bentham, Field, Justice Shannon,
and the other codifiers of the law. They accomplished less than they
hoped for, and with less harm than their opponents feared. Still,
they did accomplish a great deal. Dakota Territory was their labo-
ratory, one of the first two in the English-speaking world, and the
product, on the whole, was good.
76. Field, Law Reform in the United States, 25 AM. L. REv. 516, 529 (1891).

